Could Moscow put a damper on Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal?
Could Moscow put a damper on Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal?
When Turkish officials met their Russian counterparts last year to discuss peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moscow had a blunt message.
No outsiders would be moving into their “backyard”. “The South Caucasus is a red line for us,” as one Russian official put it.
The remark reflected growing frustration in the Kremlin over Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's cosying up to Washington and the West in the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Flash forward to 2025 and the US has made a rapid entry into the region, brokering a landmark deal between Yerevan and Baku that paves the way forward to eventual peace between the long-time enemies.
Under the agreement, Washington will run a strategic transit corridor in the South Caucasus for the next 100 years.
The route, named after US President Donald Trump, will connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory.
In typical Trumpian fashion, it will be called TRIPP: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
Under the US initiative, both Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders have committed to peace and last week signed a draft agreement reached earlier this year.
While American mediation was pivotal in bridging differences, the souring of Russian–Azerbaijani relations played an equally significant role.
Baku-Moscow tensions
Tensions escalated after Moscow refused to apologise or compensate for the downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines passenger plane in December 2024.
Russian air defences shot down the plane near Grozny, killing 38 people after mistaking it for part of a Ukrainian drone swarm.
The relationship deteriorated further in July when Russian police, during a murder investigation in Yekaterinburg, raided a home and killed Azerbaijani-born brothers Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, injuring several others.
Baku's anger is evident in the coverage of its media outlets, including state TV channels, which have openly criticised Moscow.
The Azerbaijanis are also pursuing security guarantees with the US and the lifting of an ongoing US arms embargo on the state.
Several regional officials, speaking to Middle East Eye on condition of anonymity, voiced concern about potential Russian retaliation.
Some speculated that Moscow could take steps to undermine respective governments or try to engineer coups in Armenia or Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics.
Russian influence still runs deep in the governance, culture and economy of both countries, and both have a small but deeply rooted ethnic Russian minority.
For Moscow's part, state TV editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan reminded viewers over the weekend that it was Moscow that ended the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 by brokering a ceasefire, saying that Armenia could only be secure through Russian guarantees.
She accused Pashinyan of becoming sycophantic towards Trump.
Pro-Kremlin commentator Vladimir Solovyov was even more direct, warning that Russia might launch another “special military operation” in the South Caucasus, as it had done in Ukraine, if Nato bases are established there.
Some speculated that Moscow could take steps to undermine respective governments or try to engineer coups in Armenia or Azerbaijan
A senior regional diplomat told MEE that Russia could target Azerbaijan’s sizeable diaspora, estimated at two to three million ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Moscow can also seize assets belonging to the Aliyev family and allied oligarchs in Russia. Among those watched closely are Azerbaijani-Russian billionaires God Nisanov and Zarakh Iliev.
Turkey has faced similar concerns in the past regarding Baku, with which it shares close ethnic and cultural ties.
During the 2020 conflict, Ankara not only supplied armed drones, electronic warfare systems and intelligence capabilities, it also facilitated the involvement of Syrian fighters.
Turkish officials were also involved in the identification and suppression of pro-Russian elements within the Azerbaijani military.
One such case was Najmeddin Sadikov, then-chief of the general staff, who was suspected of pro-Russian sympathies.
A source familiar with the issue told MEE that Turkish officials arranged for his removal during the war, brought him to Turkey for questioning and later allowed him to return to Russia.
Russian influence in Armenia
Armenia remains deeply tied to Moscow through border security, military bases and economic dependence.
“I would watch my back if I were Pashinyan,” one regional diplomat told MEE after the signing ceremony at the White House on Friday.
Armenia relies heavily on Russian natural gas and grain, said Joshua Kucera, senior analyst for the South Caucasus at the International Crisis Group.
Migration further cements the link with Armenia, with over 82,000 Armenian citizens working in Russia, accounting for 2.3 percent of its foreign workforce.
Russia also maintains thousands of troops at its military base in Gyumri, and the Russian market is a major destination for Armenian agricultural exports, he added.
Indeed, during earlier Turkey–Armenia normalisation talks, Russian border guards were present during negotiations concerning the reopening of crossings, strongly indicating Russian influence.
In 2022, Pashinyan sought military assistance from the Russian-led CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) following border clashes with Azerbaijan, but the alliance declined to deploy troops.
As a sign of waning relations with Russia, in February 2024, he announced Armenia was freezing its CSTO membership.
A measured approach?
Over the past year, Pashinyan has also claimed to have thwarted several coup attempts, including one allegedly involving the Armenian Apostolic Church.
However, it's not all gloom for the Armenian leader.
Kucera noted that while Russia has leverage over Armenia, its options are limited while it remains bogged down in Ukraine in a protracted war.
“It has those levers, but if you use them, then what? It will only convince more Armenians that Russia is not a reliable partner,” he said.
Kucera added that there were already signs out there that indicate Moscow might follow a measured approach in the country.
The Kremlin may aim to secure a 'minority stake' in Armenian politics
In April, for example, Russian business daily Vedomosti, which has close ties to the Kremlin, reported that the first deputy head of the presidential administration, Sergey Kirienko, had been assigned to oversee the “Armenia file”.
Its report suggested the Kremlin may aim to secure a “minority stake” in Armenian politics, expecting Pashinyan to win next year’s presidential election.
“The Kremlin would be comfortable reminding Armenia of its presence by trying to secure at least a minority package in its politics,” the paper quoted an expert as saying.
Officially, Moscow has formally welcomed the Armenian–Azerbaijani accord over the weekend, but also warned:
“The involvement of non-regional players should strengthen the peace agenda, not create new divisions.”
It added that it hoped to avoid repeating the “unfortunate experience” of Western-led conflict resolution in the Middle East.
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