How the UAE built a circle of bases to control Gulf of Aden

From the islands of Socotra in the Indian Ocean to the coasts of Somalia and Yemen, satellite imagery analysed by Middle East Eye reveals a greatly expanded network of military and intelligence bases built by the United Arab Emirates.  

This ring of control, in and around one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, has escalated rapidly since the 7 October Hamas-led attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza.

The UAE’s allies, including Israel and the US, have been party to the creation and expansion of the bases.

Israeli officers have been on the ground in the islands and Israeli radar systems and other military and security apparatus allow the UAE to monitor and thwart attacks launched by the Houthis, the Iran-aligned movement that has fired missiles at Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians and targeted ships going through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The UAE and Israel have an intelligence-sharing platform known as Crystal Ball, whereby they "design, deploy and enable regional intelligence enhancement” in partnership, according to a slide show designed to promote the pact.

“The relationship between the UAE and Israel was very developed even before formal diplomatic relations were established, but it was kept quiet. Not secret, just quiet,” Alon Pinkas, an Israeli diplomat who served as an adviser to four foreign ministers, told MEE. 

The bases have not been constructed on territory formally held by the UAE.

Instead, they are to be found in areas nominally controlled by its allies, including Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), the Yemeni military commander Tareq Saleh, and the regional administrations of Somaliland and Puntland, which are both part of Somalia, whose government is at odds with the UAE. 

Military bases, runways and other facilities have been constructed or expanded on Abd al-Kuri and Samhah, two islands that are part of the Socotra archipelago, which is now administered by STC; at the airports of Bosaso and Berbera in Puntland and Somaliland; Mocha in Yemen; and Mayun, a volcanic island in the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which 30 percent of the world’s oil is shipped.

This network of bases facilitates the control of this vital stretch of water by the UAE and its allies, and has been developed in close coordination with Israel, according to Israeli sources.

They facilitate a joined-up network of missile defence and intelligence sharing between Israel, the UAE and other allies.

As the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel US think tank, puts it: “Multilateral air-defence coalitions have become key to the post-October 7 Middle East defence landscape, with countries sharing radar, intelligence and early warning systems."  

While this string of bases is vital when it comes to monitoring global shipping traffic and any Houthi or Iranian activity in the area, Bosaso and Berbera have, according to multiple diplomatic and local sources, become increasingly important for the UAE’s support of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s war.

The creation of a network of bases surrounding the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden mimics the way in which the UAE has used its unparalleled financial power to establish outposts in many of the countries that surround Sudan, including the southeastern part of Libya controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, Chad, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.

The UAE also has two bases inside Sudan, which has been at war since April 2023: Nyala in South Darfur and al-Malha, 200km from el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which has been under a brutal RSF siege for over 500 days.

Though it has always denied it, the United Nations has deemed multiple, in-depth reports – including from Middle East Eye – on the UAE’s patronage of the RSF, which the US has said is committing genocide in Sudan, to be credible.

Middle East Eye has written to the UAE’s foreign ministry and its embassy in the UK for comment.

The United Arab Emirates has said previously that “any presence of the UAE on Socotra island is based on humanitarian grounds that is carried out in cooperation with the Yemeni government and local authorities”.

Wealth and power

For much of this century, the UAE, led from the emirate of Abu Dhabi by Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), has sought to project its power out from the Gulf across the Horn of Africa.

A member of the al-Nahyan family, which has ruled Abu Dhabi since the 18th century, MBZ is an implacable enemy of political Islam and a key ally of the US, which leans heavily on the UAE for its regional policy.

While the UAE has a population of 10 million, just one million of those are Emirati, the rest are expats and foreign labourers. 

Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst who focuses on North Africa and political economy, told Middle East Eye that “because countries like Ethiopia, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan are increasingly fractured and misgoverned, the UAE can exert a level of sway that would be impossible if these nations resembled, say, Algeria’s government, with full territorial control.

“Sudan and Libya exemplify this crisis: spaces where an aggressively revisionist foreign state armed with extraordinary wealth, lobbying power, and transactional diplomacy can wield disproportionate influence,” Harchaoui said, referencing the UAE’s intervention in Libya in 2011 and in Sudan on the side of the RSF.

Added to this, the US, despite maintaining “isolated interventionist projects like Israel and Greenland”, has “abandoned any notion of liberal hegemony and democratic idealism globally”.

“Mohammed bin Zayed understood these dynamics around 2009-2011,” Harchaoui told MEE. “Despite its microscopic size and lack of a noticeable army, the UAE recognised both its strengths and - crucially - its vulnerabilities if it remained passive.

“In this context, a ferocious, violent UAE launched a hegemonic project spanning both sides of the Red Sea,” he said.

Over the last decade, the UAE has become the biggest investor in ports across Africa: it receives 400 tonnes in smuggled gold from the continent every year, intervenes in wars there and has built up a soft power empire that includes the ownership of Manchester City Football Club.

“If you want to understand what the UAE is doing in Africa, read William Dalrymple’s book The Anarchy,” one western diplomat told MEE, referencing the Scottish historian’s 576-page account of how Britain’s East India Company took over India. “It’s exactly the same playbook.”

Yemen has been key to Emirati foreign policy. In 2015, the UAE led, alongside Saudi Arabia, a coalition of states that joined the war in Yemen to prop up the government against the Iran-aligned Houthi movement.

As part of this, Sudanese fighters from the RSF went to Yemen to join the UAE-Saudi coalition.

In November 2015, Cyclone Chapala tore across Yemen and the surrounding region, including Socotra, whose main island – also called Socotra and located about 400 km south of the Yemeni mainland – is home to about 50,000 people. Declaring that they were there to help the victims of the cyclone, the UAE deployed its troops to the archipelago.   

A Unesco World Heritage site known for its other-worldly dragon blood trees and occupied at different points in its history by the British and Portuguese, Socotra initially welcomed the construction of key infrastructure by the UAE. 

But the Emirati presence became entrenched and in June 2020 the STC, an ally of the UAE, seized control of the archipelago from Yemen’s Saudi-backed government. Since then, satellite imagery shows that the UAE has built up its military and intelligence activity on the islands, with the work escalating since Israel’s genocide in Gaza began.

Located to the west of Socotra, Abd al-Kuri is one of the archipelago’s islands. A stretch of rocky land rising out of the Indian Ocean near the mouth of the Gulf of Aden, it has a population of around 500 people.

Lying on the shipping lane from the Indian Ocean to the Bab al-Mandab strait, Abd al-Kuri is an early observation point for ships coming from the southeast and has been transformed, in the last few years, into a strategic military facility.

At the end of August 2020, just before Israel and the UAE normalised relations as part of the US-sponsored Abraham Accords, intelligence officers from both countries arrived on the island.

In February 2021, dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers arrived in Socotra on Emirati planes, according to local sources and two regional diplomats.

In November that year, US Naval Forces Central Command conducted a maritime exercise in the Red Sea alongside Bahrain, the UAE and Israel – the first publicly acknowledged military exercise between signatories of the Abraham Accords.

In a briefing at the time, an Israeli naval officer said that the drill "will increase the cooperation and the safety of the Red Sea, but not just the Red Sea, because we are dealing with Iranian terror" in the wider region.

According to satellite imagery, construction of an airbase on Abd al-Kuri’s northern coast began in late 2022.

As this construction was beginning, collaboration between the UAE and Israel was flourishing.

The UAE subsidiary of Israeli arms company Elbit Systems announced that it would supply defence systems to the Emirati air force. Israel deployed early warning radar systems to the UAE and then, in February 2023, the two countries unveiled a jointly created unmanned naval vessel capable of surveillance, reconnaissance and mine detection.

From October 2023, a new airstrip approximately 2.41km long and a three-km dirt extension was constructed on Abd al-Kuri. In March 2024, satellite images published by AP showed “I LOVE UAE” spelt out in piles of sand next to the runway. 

By March 2025, MEE’s satellite images show that the runway, which at its northern end was built to accommodate large transport and reconnaissance aircraft, was complete.

The runway is now capable of receiving medium to heavy military cargo aircraft, including the American C-130 Hercules, Russian Il-76 heavy transport planes and drones like the Israeli Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

At present, the UAE’s state-owned military contractor Edge Group is in talks with Elbit Systems regarding the procurement of the Israeli drones.

Runways and rocks

While work was being carried out on Abd al-Kuri, it was also proceeding apace at Samhah, the smallest of Socotra’s three inhabited islands, located deep in the Arabian Sea.

Satellite imagery shows that the UAE began constructing an airstrip on the island in 2024, with the runway completed in April 2025, alongside the paving of roads and establishment of essential support facilities.

Samhah’s rocky, mountainous terrain does not allow for the easy construction of longer runways, so it is most likely used for rapid, periodic surveillance operations rather than heavy transport. It can receive and operate the Hermes 900 and is able to support electronic reconnaissance and maritime surveillance operations.

The island’s location is ideal for monitoring the maritime passage between the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, through which about 12 percent of worldwide trade passes.

Between 25 March and 4 April 2025, satellite imagery revealed the appearance of a temporary sandbar on the western side of Samhah, which was not visible in previous images seen by MEE. This small sandbar appears to have been formed for temporary marine drainage, a common pattern in isolated military construction projects.

While this was taking place, the Young Star, a Comoros-flagged landing craft with IMO number 1095973, which was most likely being used to unload equipment used to prepare the runway, could be seen anchored off the island’s west coast.

Ship tracking data shows that the vessel continues to move periodically between Samhah, Abd al-Kuri and Socotra, and that it docks at nearby Yemeni ports before returning to Abu Dhabi.

Other ships, including the Takreem and al-Mabroukah 2, have been tracked by MEE moving between the main island of Socotra, the coast of Yemen, Abd al-Kuri and Bosaso, connecting the UAE’s ring of control.

While Abd al-Kuri, Samhah and Socotra are integral to this network of bases, it is Mayun (also known as Perim), a volcanic island in the Bab al-Mandab strait, that occupies the most strategically vital position.

Known as the “gate of tears” because of its large protruding rocks and wild seas, the Bab al-Mandab is situated between the Horn of Africa and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, with Yemen on one side and Eritrea and Djibouti, which hosts a significant US military base and troops from western countries including the UK, on the other.

It is one of the world’s crucial maritime chokepoints for energy shipments and commercial cargo and was seriously impacted after the Houthis began attacks there in November 2023.

While the US and the Houthis signed a deal in May this year that stopped the attacks – as well as US-led bombing campaigns in Yemen – marine traffic in the Bab al-Mandab is still short of the average of 72-75 ships a day seen before November 2023.

Strategically important even before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the East India Company first occupied Mayun in 1799 before Britain formally seized it in 1858, keeping hold of it until 1967.

As early as 2021, reports emerged of a “mysterious airbase” being built on Mayun, with no country taking claim of the construction.

The reports noted that the runway “allows whoever controls it to project power into the strait and easily launch air strikes into mainland Yemen… It also provides a base for any operations into the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and nearby east Africa.”

Satellite imagery from 2023 to the present day shows that the airstrip at Mayun Air Base now extends to approximately 1.85km in length, sloping from northwest to southeast along the island’s west coast. The runway is made up of a dark-coloured paved surface suitable for medium-sized aircraft or large drones and manned reconnaissance aircraft.

While in 2023 and 2024 no changes were observed on the runway, in 2025 images showed a clear change, indicating that surface levelling and resurfacing work had been carried out.

There are a series of hangars around the base large enough – the longest and widest is 660 metres x 100 metres – to house drones and possibly reconnaissance aircraft. Satellite imagery also shows residential facilities on the base, allowing for the deployment of dozens of military and technical personnel.

Surveillance and supply lines

The island bases are connected by maritime routes, infrastructure patterns and intelligence facilities to the UAE’s military presence in Bosaso and Berbera, two ports in Somalia’s Puntland and Somaliland regions.

The use of these two regions, which both have separatist movements seeking a break from Somalia, has placed the UAE in opposition to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government in Mogadishu.

In September, Africa Confidential reported on the “chronic enmity” between MBZ and the Somali president, which it said was partly the result of the UAE’s “hegemonic ambitions” in the Horn of Africa.

How the UAE kept the Sudan war raging

Read More »

Satellite imagery shows that at Bosaso Air Base, located next to Bosaso International Airport, Emirati management has established a radar facility, fortified ammunition depots, a dedicated cargo area for IL-76 heavy transport aircraft, a field hospital, a vehicle storage yard that houses dozens of pickup trucks, aircraft hangars and the original hangar of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF).

The PMPF was initially run by a UAE-based company, in violation of a UN arms embargo, and reported directly to the Puntland president, bypassing the sovereignty of the Somali federal government. 

Imagery from Google Earth indicates rapid and intense building work carried out on the eastern edge of Bosaso Air Base between January 2024 and January 2025. In that time, three helipads; a group of large, enclosed hangars able to accommodate drones; and a fully paved operating area connected to those hangers were constructed.

Satellite imagery from the northern end of the base at Bosaso shows what appears to be an Emirati-operated French-made GM-403 radar, though there have been reports that an Israeli-made EL/M-2084 system - the same used by Israel's Iron Dome - is in use. 

Both the French and Israeli radar systems are capable of tracking more than a thousand drones, aircraft, missiles or artillery at a range of more than 400km. In Bosaso, this means covering the Gulf of Aden and the entrance to the Red Sea.

According to multiple Sudanese, diplomatic and local sources, the UAE is also using Bosaso to transfer weapons and ammunitions to the RSF in Sudan.

The IL-76 transport aircraft has been seen in satellite imagery parked on a civilian airport landing strip to the southeast of the Bosaso airfield. Also seen in satellite imagery was a Hercules C-130, a military transport aircraft for heavy equipment.

In early 2024, two or three of these transport flights were arriving every day. By mid-2025 these were operating at about 15 per month.

On Monday, according to flight tracking data, a Boeing 737-436 arrived at Bosaso 8.50am UTC and then departed on its return flight to Abu Dhabi.

Complicated alliance

The UAE’s engagement with Somaliland, perhaps the autonomous region with the strongest independence movement within Somalia, goes back to 2017.

To strengthen its claim to autonomy, the Somaliland government accepted an Emirati bid to establish a military base in Berbera, which has become part of the network connecting the Yemeni islands and Bosaso.

Satellite imagery shows that in Berbera, the naval base had been quietly transformed from a stalled project to a nearly completed facility, with advanced infrastructure including a modern military port, a deep-water dock, an airstrip with hangars and support facilities, all constructed.

The runway at Berbera is 4km long, meaning it can receive heavy transport aircraft and fighter jets. The creation of all these facilities has turned Berbera into a regionally important strategic hub.

In June, Abu Dhabi finalised an agreement to build a railway linking the Somaliland port to Ethiopia, another sign of its pre-eminence in the Horn of Africa.

“The present reality combines several elements,” Harchaoui told MEE. “The UAE’s extraordinary propaganda and lobbying machinery, its willingness to intervene militarily across multiple theatres, its financial resources, and its complete disregard for international norms and UN Security Council arms embargoes.”

Pinkas, the Israeli diplomat, agreed that Emirati and Israeli strategic cooperation was built on an alignment of regional interests including "stability, anti-terrorism, anti-radicalism and deterring Iran", but noted that the relationship was not immune to the strains exposed by Israel's war in Gaza and its attacks on regional countries including Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Yemen and Qatar.   

“Ostensibly, these interests persist, but the ongoing war and devastation in Gaza and Israel’s belligerency complicates the public alliance,” he told MEE, saying that the “arrogant, condescending and untrustworthy” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had done damage to the relationship of late.

But while the UAE navigates open diplomacy with Israel, its operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea continue, with ships and aircraft coming in and out of the bases that form its ring of control. There could be no clearer sign of the scale of this small monarchy’s monumental ambition.