Trump's national security plan calls end to Middle East wars. But is it for real?

US President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) has stirred heated debate about Washington’s future posture in the world, its strong anti-liberal ideological footprint, and the prospects for transatlantic relations as the Russia-Ukraine war reaches a critical stage.

The new vision is part of a wider rejection of the post-Cold War order. It moves away from the “democracy versus autocracy” framework outlined by the Biden administration just three years ago, and explicitly rejects the goal of “permanent American domination” in favour of “global and regional balances of power”.

Among the regions where this balance assumes a critical importance is the Middle East, where the new doctrine seems relevant not for what it says, but mainly for what it does not.

To summarise in one sentence, it appears that the post-9/11 era is over.

What the new US strategy seeks in the Middle East is “to prevent an adversarial power from dominating … its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the ‘forever wars’ that bogged us down in that region at great cost”.

The NSS thus outlines a fundamental pivot away from deep political and military engagement in the Middle East, which has for decades characterised US foreign and defence policy. The focus now seems more on maintaining critical energy supplies and trade relations, rather than on sustaining a theatre that requires constant engagement for crisis management.

Here, as in other sections of the NSS, the shift is based on a reassessment of US priorities and interests. This is built upon certain assumptions, including American energy independence, an allegedly degraded Iranian nuclear threat, and the ostensible move towards a resolution of regional conflicts. The document notes that the Middle East is “no longer the constant irritant, and potential source of imminent catastrophe, that it once was”.

In a nutshell, it implies a move from “forever wars” to regional burden-shifting.

Pragmatic partnerships

Rejecting forever wars has been a core Trump principle since his first administration, but only in this second one has it been fully incorporated into the country’s national security strategy.

Intensive military involvement, nation-building, and direct leadership in regional security are now relics of the past. Terrorism will be addressed without large-scale ground wars - not to mention the fact that former terrorists are now US partners, including Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, aka Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who formerly led the al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra.

Democracy promotion and human rights protection are out; business and investment opportunities and partnerships are in.

Facts on the ground tell a different story. Is this another textbook case of Washington misreading the region?

In other words, the US will now accept regional leaders and governments “as they are”, moving towards more transactional and pragmatic alliances based on mutual economic interests, not values. 

But are we sure that the assumptions behind the NSS are correct?

US energy independence certainly is, but there is an aspect that Washington should not underestimate. The OPEC+ format, driven by Russia and Saudi Arabia, is still the major driver in fixing global oil prices - and this is a fact that should not escape the Trump administration, even as it touts the “drill baby drill” slogan. In addition, the US pivot away from the Middle East region opens a vacuum that China or Russia could fill.

The US hubristically claims the “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity, but it would be interesting to know whether Israeli intelligence shares this optimistic assessment. There is no hint of any future diplomatic track in the NSS document.

Containing conflicts

As for the move towards resolution of regional conflicts, this seems overly optimistic, to say the least.

In Gaza, Hamas has not disarmed, and the second and third phases of Trump’s ceasefire deal remain highly uncertain - especially as the core issues, Palestinian rights and statehood, have not been clearly addressed in this plan, nor in the accompanying UN resolution. Incidentally, this also affects future prospects for the Abraham Accords, with the crucial joining of Saudi Arabia on hold for precisely that reason.

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In Lebanon, Hezbollah is similarly resisting disarmament, and even top US officials, like envoy Tom Barrack, doubt the feasibility of this strategy. It seems the word “disarmament” is slowly being taken over in the public discourse by the word “containment”.

The NSS’s assertion that Syria may stabilise “and reassume its rightful place” in the region seems hopeful at best, ignoring the complexities of the post-Assad era, where Israel and Turkey could directly clash, and the Kurdish issue is not settled.

As for Yemen and the Houthis, Washington should recall that the issue is out of the headlines not because the group was defeated, but because the US preferred to opt for a ceasefire.

Israel is scant mentioned in the NSS document, beyond a vague reference that it must “remain secure”. There is no trace of the ironclad commitment to the Jewish state mentioned so frequently in US policies, nor any reference to shared values or the notion of Israel as “the only democracy” in the region.

The impression, then, is of an emerging divergence between the strategy pursued by the US, and the reality upon which it is built; facts on the ground tell a different story. Is this another textbook case of Washington misreading the region?

The NSS aims for a historic reduction of US political and financial costs in the Middle East, amid a search for great business opportunities in the Gulf and the reconstruction of ravaged areas, including Gaza and Syria. These seem to be admirable goals, but their viability depends almost entirely on whether the region’s conflicts remain contained - an assumption that cannot be taken for granted.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.