The Middle East crisis marks another step towards a post-Western order
The military and political confrontation between the United States and Iran is becoming less a crisis than a permanent feature of the international landscape. A new center of chronic instability is emerging in south-western Eurasia, and it will shape political and economic developments across the wider region for years to come.
This matters not only because of Iran’s geopolitical position, but because it’s now a permanent member of both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Unlike Russia’s confrontation with the West, which is mediated through the conflict in Ukraine, Iran’s dispute with Washington is direct and that reality inevitably raises questions about how BRICS and the SCO will function as organizations and what role they can play in an increasingly fragmented international order.
Both groups emerged from the crisis of the liberal world order that became apparent in the early 2000s when the American-led ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq convinced many governments that the promised unipolar world had failed to deliver stability or impartial global leadership.
The SCO, founded in 2001, was designed to strengthen regional cooperation in Eurasia while BRICS, launched in 2009, sought broader coordination among leading non-Western powers on global issues. Both represented a growing lack of confidence in institutions dominated by the United States and its allies.
Yet neither organization has attempted to build a direct alternative to the Western-led international system. This restraint has always served two purposes in that first, it allows countries with very different attitudes towards the West to remain within the same framework, and second, it avoids alienating the many states of the Global Majority that prefer to maintain productive relations with both China and Russia on one hand, and the United States and Western Europe on the other.
As a result, BRICS and the SCO have generally adopted cautious and consensual positions and their public rhetoric has often created the impression that Western behavior presents no fundamental challenge to international stability, and that there’s little urgency in constructing alternative institutions of global governance.
This has always been something of a contradiction, given the very existence of BRICS and the SCO is itself a vote of no confidence in the post-Cold War order. If their members genuinely believed that the US and the EU could provide fair and effective leadership in global governance and Eurasian security, there would have been little reason to create entities from which Western powers are largely absent.
Sooner or later, both organizations were always going to confront the question of what comes next and Iran’s confrontation with the United States has simply accelerated that debate.
It also exposes the limits of consensus politics as only Russia has unequivocally condemned what it describes as American and Israeli aggression against Iran. Other members, including China, have adopted far more cautious public positions; while welcoming the ceasefire in April and the memorandum signed in June, the diversity of views makes coordinated political action difficult.
At the same time, the conflict creates several practical challenges that BRICS and the SCO cannot ignore, and the first is energy security. The assumption that the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz would eventually return to their previous stability is no longer realistic given Washington has transformed its relationship with Tehran from political confrontation into military-political rivalry. That shift will permanently alter one of the world’s most important energy corridors.
For resource-rich powers such as Russia or the United States, this is manageable, but for countries heavily dependent on imported energy, including China and India, the implications are considerably more serious.
The second challenge concerns transport and logistics because Iran occupies a central position in the International North-South Transport Corridor linking Russia with the Middle East and South Asia and persistent instability will inevitably complicate investment and long-term planning.
The situation may become even more complicated if tensions between Israel and Turkey continue to grow beneath the surface and Central Asian states, increasingly viewed as attractive destinations for investment and trade, will have to adjust their own development strategies accordingly.
The third issue concerns America’s regional alliance system. As Washington becomes more deeply involved in confrontation with Iran, it places growing pressure on its Middle Eastern partner, but the wealthy Gulf monarchies have little desire to transform themselves into heavily militarized societies resembling Israel and their strategic calculations are becoming more complicated with every escalation.
These are immediate concerns, but the longer-term consequences may prove even more significant as the continuing confrontation between Washington and Tehran represents not only a challenge for BRICS and the SCO, but also an opportunity.
The broader international environment is changing and increasingly, the United States and the wider West are no longer viewed as providers of stability and development. Instead, many countries see them as sources of geopolitical disruption as confidence in the Western-led order continues to erode, while its ability to present itself as the natural center of global governance weakens.
A prolonged American confrontation with Iran is likely to reinforce that trend, given it will consume diplomatic attention and expose the limitations of US power in managing multiple crises simultaneously. For organizations such as BRICS and the SCO, this creates opportunities that don’t require ideological confrontation or institutional overreach.
Attempting to forge a unified foreign policy among such diverse memberships would only generate internal divisions. The strength of both groups lies precisely in their flexibility and they provide platforms where countries with different interests can cooperate without requiring complete political alignment.
That model is becoming increasingly valuable as the existing international system loses coherence.
So, rather than trying to mirror Western alliances, BRICS and the SCO should continue offering frameworks for practical cooperation while allowing members to pursue their own national interests because as confidence in Western institutions continues to decline, their relevance will grow naturally.
The collapse of the international order built around Western dominance isn’t a temporary phenomenon and the task for BRICS and the SCO is therefore not to create artificial unity where it does not exist, but to take advantage of the strategic space opened by that transformation and that may ultimately prove to be their greatest strength.
This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club , translated and edited by the RT team.
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