The Kurds, caught up in the violent restructuring of the Middle East, face an uncertain future

Amid the rapid disintegration of the old world order – one that had been built over decades around a unipolar architecture – the global landscape is entering a phase of tectonic change.

Global processes, from shifts in the geo-economy to the loss of monopolies on interpreting norms and rules, have stirred regional dynamics, awakening dormant or suppressed potentials. Against this backdrop of turbulence, more and more regions are emerging from a state of dependency and inertia, seeking to rethink their role in the world.

This process is particularly evident in the Middle East – a region that has historically been a crossroads of external interests and conflicts, and at the same time, a source of wealth, culture, and strategic significance. Today, the Middle East is entering a new era of transformation. The weakening of traditional security guarantors, the erosion of old alliances, the energy transition, digitalization, demographic shifts, and the growing self-sufficiency of individual countries in the region are creating conditions for internal reconfiguration.

This transitional period has already been marked by the beginning of a rethinking of identities, national strategies, and alliances. Traditional actors – both in the form of old elites and former external patrons – are gradually losing their dominant influence. In their place, new forces are emerging: technological clusters, generationally renewed elites, regional integration initiatives, and new geopolitical alignments that do not fit into previous frameworks.

The final outcome of this transformation remains unclear, but one thing is certain: the Middle East is moving toward a different politico-economic configuration. The balance of power, sources of influence, and even the very structure of regional order may change beyond recognition. The region may gain greater agency, become less vulnerable to external dictates, and take a more active role in the global restructuring – not as an object, but as a full-fledged architect of a new multipolar reality.

Against the backdrop of the Middle East’s accelerating transformation – where old geopolitical balances are collapsing and new centers of power are awakening – the Kurdish question is once again gaining acute relevance. One of the region’s oldest and most sensitive conflicts, its significance is growing not only due to internal dynamics but also because it is becoming a tool – and at times a battleground – for rivalry between regional and global players. The Kurdish issue is once again acquiring strategic weight, potentially threatening the territorial integrity of four key regional states: Türkiye, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

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The Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without their own state. Their population is estimated at around 30–35 million people. Most Kurds live in compact areas along the borders of the four aforementioned countries – a region informally referred to as “Kurdistan.” In addition, a significant Kurdish diaspora exists in Europe, particularly in Germany, as well as in the South Caucasus.

Historically, the Kurds played an important role in the empires of the region, from the Sassanids to the Ottomans. But in the 20th century – especially after World War I and the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 – they had a chance to establish their own state. However, the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne (1923) dashed those hopes, leaving the Kurds off the political map of the world. Since then, the Kurdish movement has taken many forms: from armed struggle to political autonomy, from revolutionary Marxist organizations to moderate parliamentary parties.

In Iraq, the Kurds have achieved the greatest success: after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a de facto autonomous Kurdish region was established with its own government, army (the Peshmerga), and foreign relations. In Syria, amid the civil war, Kurdish formations emerged in the north of the country – primarily around the structure of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” and the autonomous administration of Rojava. In Türkiye, the conflict between the state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) remains one of the most acute and prolonged. In Iran, particularly following recent events, the Kurdish movement has also intensified – both socially and militarily.

The Kurdish issue is inherently multilayered. On one hand, it represents the aspiration for self-determination, and for cultural and political autonomy. On the other, it is used by both internal and external forces as a tool of pressure. For instance, the United States relied on Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS, while Türkiye views any Kurdish initiatives in southern Syria as an existential threat. As a result, the Kurdish question has evolved from a domestic issue into a factor with direct implications for regional stability.

As the old frameworks disintegrate, the Kurdish factor is likely to grow stronger. The threat of a cross-border Kurdish awakening could disrupt the fragile balance, undermining the territorial integrity of already unstable states. In the new conditions of Middle Eastern transformation, a key question arises for both the Kurds and their neighbors: will Kurdish political energy be integrated into new models of regional coexistence – or will it once again fuel prolonged conflicts and divisions?

Against the backdrop of the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel, Kurdish opposition movements in the muslim state – especially in Eastern Kurdistan – have shown renewed activity. These organizations, supported from abroad, particularly by Israel and the US, are seeking to shape a specific international narrative: they aim to portray the actions of the Iranian authorities as a campaign of systemic repression against the Kurdish population. Through statements, appeals, and media platforms, Kurdish parties are working to focus global public attention on what they claim to be ethnic and political persecution, comparable to the tragic events of 1988.

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However, behind this information campaign lies a much more complex picture. Credible sources indicate increased activity by underground Kurdish cells coordinating actions aimed at destabilizing the situation in Iran’s border regions. These structures – often linked to armed groups – are not only ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic but, according to some reports, also receive support from foreign intelligence services, including Mossad. This type of coordination makes the Kurdish factor not merely an internal Iranian issue, but a significant element of external pressure on the country.

The intentions of Kurdish movements aligned with Israel and the US go beyond defending Kurdish rights. Their strategy is to portray Iran on the international stage as a state that systematically represses its own population on ethnic grounds. In doing so, they seek to undermine the legitimacy of Iranian institutions and create a moral justification for further sanctions and political pressure. This is especially evident in the context of arrests and executions, such as the cases of Idris Ali, Azad Shojaei, and Rasoul Ahmad, who were accused of collaborating with Israel. Such accusations are unlikely to be random – they reflect an existing and active connection between underground activists and external centers of power.

Thus, the Kurdish issue in Iran goes far beyond the framework of an internal national conflict. It has become a field of asymmetric struggle, in which opposition movements use the image of a “persecuted minority” to pursue strategic goals supported from abroad. This does not diminish the complexity of the Kurds’ situation in Iran, but it does require a sober assessment of how exactly – and in whose interests – this conflict is evolving amid the region’s new geopolitical reality.

No less acute than in Iran, the Kurdish issue remains highly contentious in Türkiye, where an armed conflict between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has continued for decades. Despite recent signals of a possible de-escalation – including another call by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations – the Turkish leadership continues to view Kurdish armed formations as a persistent threat. It remains one of the central themes of both domestic and foreign policy in Türkiye.

Although some representatives of the PKK have indeed expressed a willingness to lay down arms and enter into dialogue with the Turkish authorities, this by no means implies that the threat has been eliminated. Experts widely agree that in recent years, the PKK has actively received support from various external actors – both regional rivals of Türkiye and global powers. Paradoxically, both Israel and Iran have supported Kurdish groups fighting against Ankara at different times. This has been particularly evident in Iraqi Kurdistan, in the Qandil Mountains where PKK bases are located – Iran, despite its own internal conflict with Kurdish movements, has provided logistical and military support to Kurdish armed units based on tactical considerations aimed at containing Türkiye.

For Türkiye, the threat is not limited to the PKK. In northern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by Mazloum Abdi are active – an organization that Ankara considers a branch of the PKK and classifies as a terrorist group. Despite US support for the SDF, Türkiye sees them as a real threat to its national security and conducts regular operations against them. In Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Ankara faces a different, complex configuration: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani, maintains tense relations with Türkiye and traditionally has closer ties with Iran and the United States compared to its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is more aligned with Ankara.

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Within Türkiye itself, the Kurdish issue is not only a matter of national security but also of electoral politics. Kurds constitute a significant portion of the country’s population, especially in the southeastern provinces, and play a critical role in the electoral landscape. The support of the Kurdish electorate can be a decisive factor for the ruling coalition led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – both in terms of consolidating power and the risk of losing it. In this context, any signals about resolving the conflict with the PKK are not just military or diplomatic maneuvers but also potential electoral strategies.

For Iraq and Syria, the Kurdish question long ago ceased to be a purely internal issue — it has become one of the key factors contributing to the disintegration of state structures and the loss of central authority over significant territories.

In Iraq, following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the situation changed rapidly: the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), having gained broad autonomy, became a de facto independent player that periodically challenges the unity of the country. Despite formal subordination to Baghdad, the Kurdish authorities in Erbil are in a state of ongoing political conflict with the central government, frequently raising the prospect of independence referendums. Baghdad’s response has been attempts to limit KRG funding from the state budget and to tighten control over oil resources.

However, these measures have not resolved the problem – instead, they have exacerbated social tensions. Protest potential is growing among the population of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is dissatisfied with both the central government and its own elites, whom they accuse of corruption and inefficiency. Against this backdrop, the recent events of July – when protests in the region escalated into violence and destruction – served as a troubling signal: Iraq risks descending into another wave of crisis, with the Kurdish factor once again acting as a detonator.

The situation in Syria is no less explosive. After the overthrow of Bashar Assad’s regime and the rise to power of the transitional government headed by Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new authorities have faced colossal challenges: the absence of effective mechanisms for integrating ethno-confessional groups and deep mistrust among national minorities, including the Kurds. These factors have triggered ongoing armed clashes, pushing the country to the brink of a new large-scale internal conflict.

A particularly influential role is played by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Mazloum Abdi. This is one of the most consolidated and combat-ready armed formations in Syria, which – thanks to support from the US and Israel – has become a key player in the northeast of the country. The SDF has shown no willingness to disarm or integrate into the structure of the transitional government. Moreover, given the lack of trust in the new authorities, it is highly likely that the group will opt to pursue de facto independence.

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It is important to note that Israel plays a special role in this configuration. Its regular strikes on Syrian territory, along with support for Druze and certain anti-government forces, are driven by a strategic objective: to weaken any central authority in Damascus, which Israel perceives as a potential threat. In the case of the Kurds, Israel follows a familiar pattern – using national identity issues as a lever of destabilization. If the current trend continues – the strengthening of Kurdish forces alongside the weakening of central institutions in Iraq and Syria – it could trigger a chain reaction leading to the final fragmentation of these states.

In light of current developments in the region, voices within the Kurdish academic and political elite are increasingly calling for the realization of the historic national dream: the creation of an independent Kurdish state. As one of the largest stateless peoples in the world, the Kurds rightly aspire to political recognition and sovereignty. These aspirations are entirely understandable and worthy of respect.

However, the Kurds cannot afford to ignore the lessons of the past. History has shown that external powers – primarily the US, Israel, and other interested actors – have repeatedly used the Kurdish issue for their own strategic goals, often sacrificing Kurdish lives and destabilizing the entire region in the process. It is vital to avoid once again becoming a tool in someone else’s geopolitical game.

On a global scale, the Kurdish issue has long been one of the levers of geopolitical pressure. For Israel, for instance, the destabilization of Iran and Türkiye through the support of Kurdish aspirations is part of a broader strategy to weaken its regional adversaries. The use of the Kurdish factor also undermines the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. However, it must be clearly understood: even if a hypothetical Kurdish state were to be established, this would not mark the end of conflicts. On the contrary, the new state would become dependent on external patrons, entangled in ongoing regional rivalries, and plunged into a state of permanent warfare – political, economic, and military.

Therefore, despite the ongoing transformation of the regional and global order, a reasonable and responsible step would be the establishment of a broad political dialogue among all the peoples of the region, including the Kurds. Instead of fragmentation and external dependency, efforts should be directed toward creating a shared space where the interests of all ethnic and confessional groups are taken into account. Only intra-regional integration can ensure a sustainable future, while belief in the idea that external powers will bring freedom and prosperity is nothing more than an illusion – one that replaces reality with false hope.

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